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GOOD INTENTIONS MATTER 
Katharine T. Bartlett* 
HILE writing the article to which Professors Mitchell and Biel-
by have published responses,1 I was mindful of the many ways 
in which the article could be misinterpreted. In taking issue with the as-
sumption that legal controls work in a direct, linear manner to deter 
crimination, I thought I might be misunderstood to say that people are 
not responsive to incentives. In worrying about how legal sanctions ex-
ert external pressure that may crowd out the inclination of well-
intentioned people to self-monitor for bias, I feared that the article would 
be read mistakenly to oppose strong and appropriate legal rules against 
discrimination. In arguing that we should take people’s good intentions 
not to discriminate as a useful starting point for better workplace poli-
cies, rather than as the cynical exhibition of people’s self-delusion, I an-
ticipated that the article would be dismissed as a fanciful and naïve deni-
al of the existence of race and gender bias. In arguing that well-
intentioned people can overcome their natural tendencies to discrimi-
nate, I was concerned about appearing to claim that good intentions are 
sufficient to end discrimination. 
 
* A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
1 Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation 
in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1893 (2009); William T. 
Bielby, Accentuate the Positive: Are Good Intentions an Effective Way to Minimize System-
ic Workplace Bias?, 95 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 117 (2010), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/02/28/bielby.pdf; Greg Mitchell, Good Scho-
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In the case of the responses by Professor Mitchell and Professor Biel-
by, these fears were unwarranted. The responses engage the article’s ac-
tual objectives—to clarify the state of empirical knowledge about un-
conscious workplace bias and to evaluate proposed approaches to 
reducing it. Professors Mitchell and Bielby, both leading figures in re-
search about workplace bias, bring their considerable expertise to bear 
on evaluating and expanding the themes of the article. They each agree 
that legal scholars have ignored some of the relevant psychological lite-
rature and interpreted the research on which they have drawn in a shal-
low way. They also correctly identify my concerns about the overuse of 
legal coercion to reduce workplace bias, and concur that more legal con-
trols are not likely be effective in reducing implicit bias. 
Beyond these areas of agreement, there are differences in emphasis 
and enthusiasm. Professor Mitchell warns against too much reliance on 
research findings that are based on the responses of people (typically 
college students) to hypothetical situations. Professor Mitchell is well-
known for his cautions against the application of experimental research 
findings to real-world settings. Some of his work criticizes social psy-
chologists and legal scholars for exaggerating the prevalence of implicit 
bias.2 He does not direct this criticism against me here, perhaps because 
I make no claim about the frequency with which implicit bias occurs and 
nothing in my article turns on its exact magnitude.3 He does draw further 
attention to the need for better field research and offers one helpful ex-
planation for why it is so hard to get: managers in a position to adopt 
testable workplace practices are reluctant to adopt these practices in the 
absence of good evidence that they might actually work.4 No one could 
dispute the need for further applied research. Fortunately, as Professor 
Mitchell notes, some scholars are busy at it.5 
While noting the dangers of overreading the laboratory research on 
which the article cautiously relies, Professor Mitchell proposes a 
―scal[ing] up‖ of the article’s thesis from company managers to the 
 
2 Mitchell, supra note 1, at 112 n.6. For Mitchell’s extensive views on the limits of existing 
research on implicit bias, see Gregory Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 McGeorge L. Rev. 687 
(2009), and work cited at Mitchell, supra note 1, at 112 n.6. 
3 And, perhaps, because Mitchell already has written extensively on this point. See Mit-
chell, Second Thoughts, supra note 2. 
4 Mitchell, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
5 Id. at 113–15. For examples, see Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing 
Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 247 (2006), and sources 
cited in Mitchell, supra note 1, at 113 n.8. 
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company itself.6 At the firm level, he observes, the legal system some-
times discourages companies from adopting workplace practices that 
might ameliorate bias. His example is a well-intentioned firm that under-
takes in-house audits and organizational culture reviews to determine 
which of its workplace structures might obscure or enable workplace bi-
as, only to have these materials used against the company in subsequent 
adversarial litigation.7 Whether and to what extent a firm would be pena-
lized by such audits and reviews depends in part, even under existing 
law, on the way the company responds to them.8 The example, though, 
is a useful one, in showing that companies, as well as individuals, can 
have good intentions that might be thwarted by policies that are too ea-
ger to find fault and impose liability.9 
Professor Bielby’s principal response to the article is that it focuses 
on the cognitive aspects of discrimination rather than the structural 
forces that support it. While Professor Bielby agrees that more law to 
combat implicit bias is a ―bad idea,‖10 he believes that the case I have 
made for more attention to the motivational consequences of workplace 
diversity measures is wrongly grounded in the psychological processes 
of implicit bias rather than in the ―organizational policies, practices, and 
structures that create and sustain unlawful racial and gender inequality at 
work.‖11 
Professor Bielby is correct that the focus of the article is on the psy-
chology of discrimination. The article’s purpose is to respond to legal 
scholars who assume that bias is a pervasive psychological phenomenon 
to which the solution is stronger legal controls. The article provides a 
fuller account of the psychology of bias by differentiating between the 
motivations that might lead people to avoid it. It demonstrates that 
measures that motivate people internally are more effective in reducing 
bias than external constraints, and that the law, insofar as it functions as 
an external constraint that may crowd out people’s internal motivation to 
be unbiased, may actually exacerbate bias rather than reduce it. The ar-
ticle does not ignore the role of workplace structures. In fact, it endorses 
 
6 Mitchell, supra note 1, at 114. 
7 Id. at 115. 
8 Id. at 115 n.11. 
9 Apart from its negative impact on a company’s positive internal identity, it should be 
noted that the policy may be defective, as well, on the basis of the negative external incen-
tives it produces. 
10 Bielby, supra note 1, at 117. 
11 Id. at 119. 
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various structural measures that work to strengthen people’s internal 
motivation to act in unbiased ways, including collaborative structures 
that facilitate positive intergroup interactions, job rotation systems, up-
per management role models who demonstrate a genuine commitment to 
diversity, and accountability systems that further participation and a 
sense of ownership by those involved. 
Professor Bielby’s criticism is that, in making the case for these and 
other measures, I remain too focused on what goes on in people’s heads, 
rather than on what they do. Susan Sturm, in conversations with me, has 
made a similar observation. I take the point—to a point. Our shared ob-
jective is the reduction of bias, not moral salvation; people’s good inten-
tions are valuable as a means of reducing bias, but is not itself the goal. 
The same thing can be said, however, about workplace structures; they 
are a means to an end, not the end itself. Both good intentions and 
workplace structures that promote unbiased decision-making are impor-
tant, independently and in interaction with one another. As the research 
in the article suggests, attitudes and beliefs affect the impact that various 
workplace structures might have, and vice versa. I accept Professor Bi-
elby’s point that discrimination operates in institutions. I hope he will 
accept mine that discrimination operates in people’s minds as well. Both 
matter. 
Professor Bielby notes the vagueness of the line I draw between orga-
nizational strategies that people find coercive and threatening and those 
that promote people’s intrinsic commitment to nondiscrimination.12 I 
concede that ascertaining whether a particular policy will promote or 
discourage the internalization of desired nondiscrimination norms re-
quires judgment and finesse, to which knowledge of the basic principles 
of human motivation and the dynamics within a particular work force 
are both highly relevant. Professor Bielby notes that management plays 
a role in constructing the message as positive or negative.13 Indeed. That 
is the point. Good leadership knows its people and figures out how best 
to communicate with them, aware that the internal constraints it stimu-
lates can have an even more favorable effect in how they behave than 
the external constraints it imposes. 
What happens when the organizations do not get it, or fail to transmit 
positive, nondiscriminatory values throughout the workforce? Professor 
 
12 Id. at 123. 
13 Id. 
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Bielby notes that it is ―risky‖ to rely on ―nondiscrimination efforts that 
require internally motivated well-intentioned acts in order to be effec-
tive.‖14 I could not agree more, which is why Title VII remains an essen-
tial piece of an integrated nondiscrimination policy. Title VII is the legal 
backstop—a necessary tool, especially for workplaces that are not well-
intentioned and well-run, and do not have the institutional commitment 
or structures to prevent discrimination. Title VII does a reasonably good 
job of defining what the law can define. But Title VII, no matter how 
well it is drafted, cannot do the job itself. No law can identify or appre-
hend all instances of discrimination, which is why it is so important to 
engage people’s positive attitudes as well as their fear of legal sanctions. 
Mitchell and Bielby are right to emphasize, in their different ways, 
the importance of workplace structures and institutions. Positive norms 
and good intentions alone will not do the trick. In my defense, however, 
the article does not claim that they will. To the extent that Professors 
Mitchell and Bielby understand the article to say that good intentions are 
enough,15 they misread the piece. The choice is not between internal 
norms or external structures. It is, rather, between continuing to focus on 
laws and workplace structures as the only meaningful constraints on dis-
crimination, or figuring out how to trigger the internal constraints that 
might bear some of the load. 
 
 
14 Id. at 124. 
15 Both titles imply this reading, although the responses themselves do not. 
